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Market Share Dispersion Among Leading Firms as a
Determinant of Advertising Intensity
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01003-2040, U.S.A.

Abstract Previous advertising intensity models have failed to address adequately the rivalry effects of
leading firms trying to protect and enhance the market shares of their brands. We argue that the relative

degree of market share parity among leading firms in oligopolies is a crucial determinant of market
advertising levels. This study presents a model that more thoroughly characterizes market structure
by including the variance in the market shares of the top four firms along with the concentration

ratio. This model is then tested using a unique 1987 data set of 58 well-defined U.S. food and
tobacco manufacturing markets that used private data vendors for branded product market shares and
media advertising aimed at household consumers. We find that industry advertising-to-sales ratios are
highest in those industries with the highest price-cost margins, highest concentration, and those with
equally-sized leading firms. Oligopolists seem unable to control advertising expenses as concentration
increases and they likely overinvest in advertising rivalry when they have similar market shares.

Key words: Advertising intensity, market structure, market share equality.

While Industrial Organization economists have appreciated the importance of nonprice rivalry since the 1950s, the empirical literature regarding the relationship

between advertising intensity and market concentration is not overwhelmingly
convincing. Although much of the empirical work finds a positive relationship
between industry advertising intensity and concentration, the relationship often
shows the maximum effect coming from low-grade oligopolies - those with fourfirm concentration ratios under 50.

Dorfman and Steiner (1954), first linked the advertising-to-sales ratio (A/S)
with market structure. They demonstrated that under simple neoclassical assumptions, a monopoly's optimal advertising-to-sales ratio must equal the ratio of its
advertising elasticity of demand to the price elasticity of demand for its product.
The subsequent elaboration of this model to cover oligopolistic competitors (e.g.,

* The authors thank Drs. Julie A. Caswell and Cleve E. Willis for helpful comments, as well as
those of the Editor, Dr. William G. Shepherd.
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Cable, 1972) is even more telling.1 Following Waterson

for an oligopolist i occurs where the A/ S satisfies the
= (PC Mi) ' (r¡aq ~f* Vrq ' Var)'*

where PC Mi is firm z's price-cost margin, r]ar is a con

the effect of firm z's advertising on that of rival's, r

advertising on firm ťs own demand, and rirq is the ef

firm ť s demand. Adequate estimates of these elasticitie

if not impossible, given data limitations. What one sh

however, is that optimal advertising intensity is deter

the price-cost margin and several elasticities that refl

competing firms. Although non-price rivalry is embed

extension neglects the role of market structure, name
(1984, p. 131) further extends the model to demonstra
intensity does not monotonically decline with an incr

Waterson (1984, p. 133) states, "Those who argue for
those who argue for a negative relationship between i
can both be right over some range of values".
Markets do not advertise equally, either absolutely o

some industries requires substantial investments in a

other industries requires hardly any media advertising

ology in previous research has been to model econom
of advertising intensity, advertising expenditures re
cross-sectional data. Several factors have been identifi

try's advertising intensity and thus explain the inter-i
Albion (1981) found that profit margins, market size

purchase, product durability, number of brands, and
ferentiability" were consistently related to industry a

glaring omission is the absence of any measure of ind
concentration has been included nearly universally an

nant in many studies. Buxton, Davies and Lyons review
and found conflicting evidence in the relationship bet

but their empirical results found support for a non-line

positive as concentration rises from very low levels b
at only medium levels of concentration and then the r
at higher levels of concentration.
We believe that previous research has failed to captu

structure that affects non-price rivalry. Although we ag

ture - with differentiated products, and selling to h

1 Waterson (1984, Chapter 7) provides an excellent summary of

its several extensions.
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most conducive to advertising rivalry, we contend that the distribution o

power among an industry's leading firms is an important element of mark

ture but it is masked by the concentration ratio, the most commonly use
of concentration. The use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index lessens this concern

but does not eliminate it. We argue that the variance of the leading firms' market
shares is a useful complement to the four-firm concentration ratio in predicting
which industries will use advertising most intensively.
The inclusion of the leading firms' market shares will help define the preeminent

strategic group, be it one dominant firm or several equally sized competitors.
Holding concentration constant, an oligopoly that consists of equally sized rivals
is more likely to overinvest in advertising rivalry than an oligopoly that has a
dominant leading firm. For example, compare two hypothetical industries each
with a four-firm concentration ratio of 80 and identical except for the distribution

of market shares among the leaders. Suppose the four largest firms in Industry A
each have a market share of 20. In contrast, the four largest firms in Industry B have
market shares of 70, 5, 3, and 2 percent, respectively. We expect greater rivalry and

thus greater advertising expenditures in Industry A.

A common criticism of the single equation advertising intensity model is the
potential endogeneity of profitability and concentration. If profitability or concentration is endogenously determined with advertising intensity, ordinary least
squares estimates of the model parameters would be biased. Previous researchers
have estimated advertising intensity within systems of simultaneous equations (e.g.,
Comanor and Wilson, 1974; Greer, 1971; Martin, 1979; Pagoulatos and Sorenson,
1983; Kardasz and Stollery, 1984; Zellner, 1989), though the issue of simultaneity
remains unresolved (Buxton et al., 1984). For the purposes of introducing a new
variable into the literature, we argue that the single equation approach is acceptable
and offer evidence based on Hausman tests for independence of the regressors that
suggest that our estimates do not suffer from simultaneity bias.

I. Model Specification and Data
We specify a model that closely resembles previous research, but includes a measure

of the inequality in market shares among a market's leading four firms. The model

explains variability in market advertising-to-sales ratios with price-cost margins,
market concentration, the standard deviation of the leading four firms' market
shares, and three control variables (market size, market growth, and the proportion
of sales to final consumers) as given in the following equation:

A/S = ß0 + Bi PCM + &CR4 + &CR42 + ß4 Std Dev
+ /35VOS + ß6 Growth + ß,CD/S + u.
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We then estimate the model using both Census data at th
level2 and data from private vendors for 58 processed fo
for the year 1987.
1. Advertising Intensity

The dependent variable is an industry's advertising intensity, measur
advertising-to-sales ratio (A/S). The numerator consists of 1987 consum

expenditures for seven measured-media as reported by Leading Nationa

ers (LNA).3 These advertising data are well-suited to studying advertisi
by various brand manufacturers selling to final consumers. Promotion

tising aimed at intermediate buyers are not included. The difficulties of

data are their expense and their use of a coding system that does not

Census SIC system. However, with effort, each brand's advertising can b

into the Census SIC system and then aggregated to match the Census pr

definitions (see Rogers and Tokle, 1995, for details). Census value of s

comprise the denominator; though they have been criticized for includ
food processors, food service operators, and foreign countries because

nations attract little or no domestic media advertising (Connor and Weime

10). We prefer instead to use the Census shipments and control for non
sales directly in the regression.
2. Price-Cost Margin

The price-cost margin is the most obvious regressor to include in the regression
it is the core of the Dorfman-Steiner model and its extensions. The profit marg

represents the reward for increased sales: the higher it is, the more incentive a fir

has to advertise in attempting to generate additional sales. Thus, the price-cos

margin should positively influence advertising intensity, though causality concer

could obscure this relationship.

Many studies have employed price-cost margins derived from Census data.
However, Pagoulatos and Sorenson, among others, have suggested that any cor
relation existing between Census price-cost margins and advertising intensity

spurious because their calculation fails to net out advertising. That is, advertisin
exists simultaneously on both sides of the equation. While this problem is easi
corrected, Census derived price-cost margins also rely on the quality of the Cens

data's approximation of marginal costs, which is often a concern (see Scherer an

Ross, 1990, p. 418).

2 Although the 5-digit product class typically offers the best correspondence between Census da
and economic markets, there are exceptions and at times we used the 4-digit industry (e.g., be
data because the 5-digit data were too narrowly defined (e.g., bottled beer). See Willis (1992) fo
complete explanation as well as the entire data set.

3 The measured-media are network, spot, and cable television; network radio; magazines; new
papers; and billboards.
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We avoid such problems associated with using Census price-cost ma

taking advantage of our study's focus on food industries which sell bot

brands (e.g., Kellogg's Corn Flakes) and the retailer's private label
the branded product (e.g., Safeway's Corn Flakes). We used data fr

Area Marketing Information (SAMI) and Informational Resources Inco

(IRI) to obtain brand sales and private label sales at the retail level. Th

ignore non-consumer channels of distribution and hence focus on sale

consumers through typical supermarkets. Following Connor and Peter

we use the average private label price to approximate marginal cost. They

competition among private label manufacturers ensures a price closely
marginal cost, since major entry barriers into this strategic group are

we define the price-cost margin (PCM) as the relative difference betwe
branded price and average private label price at the market level. We
measure will proxy the rewards for successful advertising at least as
Census measure, but without the problems.
3. Concentration

Some measure of concentration has been nearly universally employed in ad
tising intensity models as a dimension of industry structure although its ef
on advertising are far less certain than those of profit margins. The four-firm
centration ratio (CR4), as reported in the Census of Manufacturing, is the
commonly used measure of concentration, but the Herfindahl-Hirschman

(HI) has been used also (e.g., Cable, 1972).

Most studies have anticipated and found that advertising intensity, in gen
increases with concentration, at least over some range of concentration. T
little doubt that an increase in concentration reduces the incentive of leading
marketing differentiated products to compete with prices, which inevitably
a greater reliance on advertising and, thus, a positive advertising-concentr
relationship, but there is no reason to expect this relationship to be linear.
studies have added a quadratic concentration term to allow for a non-linear re

ship between concentration and advertising intensity. The quadratic adver

concentration hypothesis is founded on the notion that recognized interdepe
increases with concentration and after some level of concentration is reached,

will cut back on their advertising expenditures. Thus, an inverted-U shape re

ship is expected. However, we believe that a single measure of concentration
to capture fully the relative degree of market dominance and hence contam
the relationship (the HI less so because it is weighted to the largest firms).
We use the CR4 as our market concentration measure because of its wider

in previous studies and our interest in directly measuring size variations amo

leading firms. We also estimate the model using the HI for comparison. Althoug

conventional inverted-U shape hypothesis is believable, it depends on conje
about oligopolistic interaction. If this inverted-U relationship is found, we e
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that the point of maximum advertising intensity will occu
of concentration than found in most previous studies - at

of 46 to 53 percent (Scherer and Ross, 1990, p. 598).4
4. Market Share Dispersion

The degree of market share dispersion is a critical element of market structure

should influence advertising intensities, once market concentration is held con

Since symmetric leading firms in an oligopoly are more likely to recognize

collective interest in avoiding price competition, they are more likely to over

in advertising as they seek a competitive advantage and collectively raise e
barriers into their strategic group - sellers of national brands.

To capture this effect, we will use the standard deviation of the leading f
firms' market shares in branded product sales to measure the size similarity

leading four firms within the strategic group where advertising rivalry is attr

The larger it is, the more unequal are the market shares of the leading four
Particularly large values reflect the presence of a dominant firm. Small va

indicate the leading firms are essentially equal in size.
We expect market share dispersion to have a negative effect on advertis
intensity. Holding market concentration constant, the presence of asymmet
market shares yields better opportunities to reduce advertising expenditures

the optimal level than a more symmetric distribution of leading firms. A

extreme, an oligopoly with one dominant firm should be able to hold advert

intensity close to the optimum level, whereas a more equal distribution shou

to overinvestment in advertising rivalry, once concentration is held constant
The variance (and hence standard deviation) of the four leading firms' ma

shares in the jth industry, aj, is related to both the truncated four-firm Herfin
Index (HI4) and the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) as follows:5

a) = 0.25 HMj - 0.0625 CR4^.
Since the variance is a linear function of the four-firm Herfindahl Index and

a squared function of the four-firm concentration ratio collinearity may pose a
problem.6 This relationship also suggests that perhaps the HI may have been more
appropriate than four-firm concentration ratios in previous studies because of its
better ability to account for a dominant firm market structure. We prefer to use two

measures to capture more fully the market's structure - the concentration ratio for
4 It seems unlikely that leading firms will recognize their interdependence sufficiently to reduce
advertising budgets in unison at a concentration level considered workably competitive to loosely
oligopolistic.
5 The algebra is available upon request, or in Willis (1992).
The simple correlation between the four-firm Herfindahl Index and the Herfindahl Index is 0.85
for the sample used.
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measuring the degree of oligopoly and the standard deviation of the leading f
firms' market shares to measure size similarity among the leaders.

We also estimate the model using a simple alternative to the standard deviat

of the four leading firms' market shares. The alternative, which should also acc

for market share dispersion among the market leaders, is the ratio of market sha

of the two largest firms in an industry. This alternative is easier to calculate
will still detect dominant firms and provide a measure of market asymmetry.
The Census does not reveal individual firm market shares and hence we used

alternative private vendor data (SAMI and IR I) that provide market data for food
industries on sales for household consumption. In each market we calculated the
individual market share of retail sales of each of the four leading firms, along with

an aggregated share of total sales accounted for by private label products.
5. Control Variables

The previous literature has demonstrated the importance of an array of con

variables and hence we included three commonly used variables: market

market growth, and the percent of market sales that are made to final consum

Market size, measured by Census value of shipments (VOS), is included becau
advertising expenditures are often thought to rise less than proportionally to
size of the market, perhaps because of economies of scale in advertising. Far
and Albion (1981, p. 23) stated: "There seems to be little question that adverti
intensity is lower, ceteris paribus , in large markets than in small markets".
Market growth, measured by percentage change in VOS from 1982 to 1987,

included to capture the effects of market dynamism. A growing market is tho

to encourage advertising for two reasons. Typically, the rate of new product in

ductions is greater and thus periods of initial heavy advertising are more freq
It is also likely that advertising is more successful since additional sales nee

necessarily be at a rival's expense.

We included final consumer purchases as a proportion of total industry s
(CP/S) because professional buyers are unlikely to be persuaded by consumer
oriented media advertising. Thus, markets where the buyers are more likely
be professional, such as intermediate goods markets, should be less intensiv
advertised, ceteris paribus.1 Furthermore, promotional techniques vary betw
consumer and producer buyers. For example, sales representatives are more ap
priate when selling to a few purchasers (Buxton et al., 1984). The numerator,
was total sales to household consumers as reported by SAMI or IRI, whereas

denominator was Census product class VOS. Since these two sources mea

food sales at two different vertical stages of the food system, the ratio exceed

theoretical upper bound of one in a few cases. However, no superior measure

7 This effect theoretically holds constant the level of product homogeneity that such mar
display. Because we are unable to control satisfactorily for product differentiation, this variable
capture those characteristics as well.
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Table I. Descriptive statistics for 58 food and tobacco processing

Variable8 Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
A/S

PCM

2.667

3.143

0.351

0.040

0.131

18.050

0.135

0.747

CR4 60.810 19.146 22.000 97.000
HI

1.631

1.125

0.221

5.150

STD DEV 11.852 6.859 1.881 33.635

MS 12 2.808 2.335 1.012 11.483
VOS 2.787 3.308 0.165 16.746
GROWTH 0.141 0.186 -0.429 0.425
CP/S 0.652 0.267 0.100 1.220

a The variables HI and VOS are in thousands, A

in percent, and the rest are proportions. Also, a
1987, except growth is from 1982, 1987.

available that would allow us to control
Willis, 1992, for further details).
6. Data

The data assembled for this study represent a major contribution to empirical

research. This study took great care to match observations with well-defined eco
nomic markets The blending of private vendor data on market shares and med

advertising along with more commonly used Census data allows a novel oppor-

tunity to test the advertising intensity-concentration relationship. Although suc

blending is possible in food industries because of the private data providers, such
industries are also well-suited to cross-sectional research on advertising issues. Th

food manufacturing sector outspends every other manufacturing sector in adver

tising expenditures and the industries within the sector contain a wide variety o
market structures - from workable competition to shared monopolies.

We were able to compile information on the advertising-to-sales ratio and the

six independent variables at the 5-digit SIC product class level (or occasionally a

the 4-digit level if the product class level was too narrowly defined) for 58 food and

tobacco manufacturing markets.8 Observations range from canned soup to cheese
and chewing gum to refrigerated yogurt. Rich variation is evident in the sample,
evidenced by the descriptive statistics in Table I. Advertising intensity varied fro
0.04% (flour) to 18.05% (chewing gum), with a mean A/S of 2.7%.
The independent variables exhibit considerable variation as well. For instance
CR4 ranged from 22 to 97, with a mean of 60.8. The average market, thus, border

8 The complete list of observations used and their data values is given in Appendix Table A.1
of Willis (1992). Also, interested researchers may receive a complete copy of the data in electron
form.
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on tight oligopoly, however, more than one-quarter (17) have a CR4

The derived price-cost margin varies from 0.135 to 0.747, with a m

Exceptional variation exists in the standard deviation of the leadin
market shares. It ranges from 1.88 for the nonchocolate candy mar
leading four firms controlled 12.1, 9.8, 9.4, and 6.8 percent of the r

market, respectively, to 33.64 for the canned soup industry, where t

firms controlled 81.1, 8.3, 1.8, and 1.0 percent, respectively.

n. Empirical Results

The least squares estimates of the parameters for the model are sho

Because the disturbances are likely to be heteroscedastic, we used

ance estimator to compute the standard errors.10 In column 1, th
variables of our primary model explain nearly 41 percent of the v

advertising-to-sales ratio for this sample. In columns 2 and 3, two v
main model are reported. The original work (Willis, 1992) included
variants with varying measures used for the price-cost margin (e.g.,

concentration, and the degree of market share equality among the lead

results proved robust to these variants and the three versions report

the main findings of the complete study. Although statistically insig

estimated coefficients for the control variables of market size, mark

consumer purchases as a percent of total sales, hint at their respect

effects.

The estimated coefficient of the price-cost margin based on the relative difference of national brand and private label average prices, PCM, was positive as
expected. Although this is the first use of this measure of PCM in an advertising
intensity study, the result agrees with the bulk of previous theoretical and empirical findings that the profit contribution of additional sales positively influences
advertising, a potential means of increasing sales. Moreover, the magnitude of the
coefficient is generally consistent with previous empirical findings (Brush, 1976;
Farris and Buzzell, 1979).
As with many previous studies, the four-firm concentration ratio was a positive
determinant of advertising intensity. Although a linear specification yields a positive, significant result, we find that the best specification was quadratic. However,
unlike nearly all other empirical studies, we find that the relationship curves upward
9 Interestingly, the 1987 PCM calculated from SAMI data aligns well with the PCM calculated
from the 1982 Census (see Willis, 1992, for details).
10 Heteroscedasticity could theoretically arise for any number of reasons. First, the grouped industry
structure of product classes likely implies a grouped disturbance structure, though we suspect that any
arbitrariness in the Standard Industrial Classification scheme might weaken this relationship enough to
justify use of a general-form heteroscedastic-consistent estimator of the standard errors. Additionally,

statistical correlation between the disturbances and regressors will generate heteroscedasticity; in
particular, we suspect that industry size may be an offending variable through economies of scale.
11 All references to statistical significance are based on a 95 percent confidence level.
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Table H. OLS regression results of the determinants of
1987 advertising-to-sales ratios in 58 processed food and

tobacco markets

Variable (1) (2) (3)
PCM 5.016* 5.030* 5.787*

(2.03)a (2.17) (2.52)
CR4 -0.226* -0.265*

(2.14) (2.11)

CR42 0.263b'* 0.263b'*

HI

(2.24) (2.12)
0.179b'*
(1.77)

STD DEV -0.171* -0.210*

(1.85) (1.76)
MS

12

-0.348*

(2.20)
VOS -0.115e -0.090e 0.038e

(0.73) (0.63) (0.38)
GROWTH 2.203 1.710 0.347

(1.50) (1.42) (0.24)
CP/S 0.686 2.036 1.257

(0.27) (1.12) (0.56)
CONSTANT 5.553 6.003 -0.765

R2 0.408 0.398 0.316
R2 0.326 0.314 0.235
a Absolute values of Student t ratios in parentheses.
b In hundredths.
c In thousandths.

* Estimated coefficient is statistically significant a
95% confidence interval.

forming a lazy J-shape as opposed to an inverted U-shape. Our minimum effect
occurs at 41 percent as opposed to previous maxima which occurred between 46
to 53 percent and we never reach a maximum effect over the theoretical range of
CR4.

We speculate that other studies have been contaminated with observations that
were over-aggregated by including observations with too many unrelated and noncompeting products. Over-aggregation would bias true market concentration downward and might cause the relationship to reach a maximum at unlikely low levels
of concentration. For example, SIC 2844 Toilet Preparations, is commonly used in
cross-sectional studies. It is an intense user of media advertising, spending over $1

billion in 1982 - the largest amount of any single U.S. industry (Rogers and Tokle,
1995). The A/S was 1 1.0%, while the CR4 was only 30, a reflection of combining
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noncompeting products. This industry contains a wide variety of nonco
products with nearly all heavy users of consumer-oriented media adverti
industry includes five 5-digit product classes with CR4s ranging from a l
the largest product class SIC 28445 - other cosmetics and toilet preparat
a high of 74 for SIC 28444 - dentifrices, including mouthwashes, dental f

denture cleaners. Even the five-digit product classes for this industry ar

broad - including such well-defined economic markets as: lubricating cre

tan lotions, sunscreens, lipsticks, mascara and eye shadow, underarm deo

fingernail polishes, talcum powder, baby wipes, bubble baths, and depilat

name some prominent ones. The implications for estimating an A/5-CR
tionship is clear - the expected positive relationship is lost due to poorl

economic markets. Although the theory is correct to imply that at some lev

centration over-investment in advertising will be checked, intuition shoul

that such levels of concentration are unlikely to generate sufficient interde

to sustain joint industry advertising reductions. We encourage the re-esti

previous studies that included the 4-digit "toilet preparations" industry in t

which involves most every previous study (e.g., Buxton et al., 1984).

The parameter estimate for the standard deviation of the leading four
market shares, STD DEV, was negative as expected and statistically sign
This provides confidence that it is an important complement to concentr
It suggests that when the standard deviation increases by one percenta
the advertising-to-sales ratio decreases by nearly two-tenths of a percent
This estimated coefficient may seem small, but evaluated at the mean s
deviation of nearly 12 percentage points, advertising intensity is decre
about 2 percentage points. This is quite an important effect given that
advertising-to-sales ratio is only 2.67 percent.
As an alternative measure of market share dispersion, we used the ra

market shares of the two largest firms, MS 12. The similarity of results (se

2) suggests this simple measure can adequately capture the asymmetry th

non-price rivalry. To appreciate this result, one need only consider the
"Cola Wars", where Coke and Pepsi compete heavily with massive spend
media advertising aimed at final consumers.
We also estimated the model with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,
regressor in place of the concentration ratio and the results are reported in

of Table I. While the HI undoubtedly captures market share asymmetry b

the concentration ratio does, the standard deviation of leading firm mark

estimate is robust to this change. Unlike with CR4, the results with HI su
linear rather than a quadratic functional form.

Concerns about the exogeneity of concentration and price-cost marg
model of advertising intensity have not gone unnoticed. We used the Hau

12 The use of White's covariance estimator actually reduced the calculated t-ratios by
larger standard errors than in the OLS results.

As expected, the dispersion measures are highly insignificant when concentration is om
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for independence of regressors to test the hypothesis that
and concentration measures were exogenous. We found n

that either the concentration ratio or the price-cost mar
this data set and feel confident that Ordinary Least Squa
unbiased estimates of this model.

Úl. Conclusions

Our results support much of the previous research findings but also add in impor-

tant ways. First, we challenge the finding that concentration exhibits its maximum
effect on the industry's advertising-to-sales ratio at four-firm concentration value

as low as 45, especially given that a four-firm concentration ratio of 40 is often
the benchmark of workable competition. Our nonlinear relationship between con-

centration and advertising-to-sales shows the relationship is positive after reachin

CR4s of 40 and continues to increase positively even at CR4 values in the 90s. In
addition, the HI had a positive significant effect on advertising intensity.

Our findings give the first empirical support that the similarity of market shares
among leading firms is a useful supplement to traditional measures of concentration.

The results suggest that as a dominant firm emerges in a market without close rivals

it can relax advertising expenditures toward the industry's optimal advertising-to-

sales ratio as defined by Dorfman and Steiner (1954). Overinvestment in advertising
becomes unnecessary. Market leaders in oligopolies with close rivals, on the other

hand, have many incentives to use advertising as a form of rivalry, which perpetuate

overinvestment. Evidently, oligopolists either find it advantageous to compete vi

advertising or difficult to hold such rivalries in check when they have similar market

shares and each is vying for an advantage. The highest advertising intensities are
found in concentrated markets that have high price-cost margins and where the

leading rivals have similar market shares. Although these results were found in a
sample of food and tobacco processing markets, we expect they would hold for an
manufacturing markets selling differentiated products to final consumers.
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